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Abstract 
Primarily due to the large gaps in economic and institutional contexts between 
the developed and emerging markets, business model innovation (BMI) at the 
subsidiary level plays an important role for the success of small and medium-
sized firms (SMEs) from the developed markets operating in the emerging 
markets as top-down venture. While some studies claim that the direct 
involvement of headquarters (HQ) of SMEs in the activities of their subsidiaries 
is essential, surprisingly little is known about how HQ specifically facilitates BMI 
at the subsidiary level, especially in the context of top-down venture. Adopting 
the method of comparative and longitudinal case study, we tracked the BMI 
process of six SMEs from Denmark operating in China. The emergent 
framework indicates that entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility at the HQ level 
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are two primary facilitators of BMI at the subsidiary level via the mechanisms of 
commitment and cooperation. We also found that BMI performance would 
influence the two facilitators in a feedback loop. Hence, we can contribute to the 
literatures on international entrepreneurship and strategic entrepreneurship by 
integrating the two previously separated research streams via their shared 
theme of accelerated learning. In particular, this study helps solve the puzzle 
concerning fast and successful international venture. 
 
Keywords: Business Model Innovation; International Strategic 
Entrepreneurship; Headquarters-Subsidiary Link; Aspiration; Flexibility; 
Emerging Markets. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Business model plays a crucial role in explaining firms’ value creation, 
competitive advantage, and overall performance, so it has received a growing 
attention from both scholars and practitioners (e.g., Hamel, 2000; Thompson 
and MacMillan, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2009; Zott, Amit and Massa, 2011). Firms 
often choose to compete by designing novel business models as the potential 
source of new competitive advantages (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; 
Markides and Charitou, 2004; Morris, Schindehutte, and Allen,  2005). Further, 
business model can be only effective if it is designed properly for the specific 
context. In that sense, the business model for the context of international 
business must be distinctive from the business model for the context of 
domestic business. Similarly, the business model for large firms with sufficient 
resources tends to differ from the business model for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) with limited resources. 
Largely due to the large gaps or distances in the economic and institutional 
contexts between the developed and emerging markets, the successful venture 
by any firm from the developed markets to the emerging markets, which we 
refer to as top-down venture, will largely depend on the business model 
designed for those markets (Cavusgil and Agarwal, 2002; Hansen, Petersen, 
and Wad, 2011; Khanna and Palepu, 2010). When venturing into the emerging 
markets, such firms often need to substantially change their prior business 
models designed for their home markets as the developed economies so as to 
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adapt to the distinctive contexts in the host markets as the emerging economies, 
especially when the emerging markets are so dynamically changing that a 
continuous adjustment in the business model is imperative. Hence, the striking 
contrast between the developed and emerging markets implies that constant 
innovation in business model for an emerging market is a special capability for 
firms to ensure their long-term success in the emerging markets (cf. Luo, 2003; 
McGrath, 2010; Sosna, Trevinyo -Rodriguez, and Velamuri, 2010). That is why 
top-down venture could be as difficult as the reverse bottom-up venture by the 
latecomer firms from the emerging markets into the developed markets. 
However, this perspective is counterintuitive because the mainstream literature 
in international business assumes the top-down venture should be easy, while 
the bottom-up venture should be difficult (e.g., Dunning, 1995, 2001; Dunning 
and Narula, 2004). Further, the traditional views assume the salience of 
exploiting existing advantages rather than exploring new advantages. However, 
these views are being challenged by the emerging perspective of the second-
home venture that can be pursued by both established and emerging 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). This new view argues that both top-down and 
bottom-up ventures will be similarly risky due to the unfamiliar gaps or distances 
in economic and institutional contexts between the developed and emerging 
markets. It is such risks that qualify both top-down and bottom-up ventures as 
entrepreneurial in contrast to the notion of any cross-border venture as 
entrepreneurial (cf. Oviatt and McDougall, 2005).  
Specifically for innovation in general and business model innovation (BMI) in 
particular at the subsidiary level, the research on the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship (HSR) has two distinctive perspectives on the involvement of 
headquarters (HQ) in the process: (1) rationality perspective, and (2) ignorance 
perspective (Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martı´n, 2011). The rationality perspective 
posits that the involvement of HQ in the innovation process at the subsidiary 
level should match the extent of HQ’s knowledge concerning the subsidiary’s 
operating context.  In contrast, the ignorance perspective assumes that HQ 
lacks the relevant knowledge so that HQ is likely to be “groping in the darkness”, 
thus unable to be effective (Ciabuschi et al., 2011). Due to the major distinction 
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between these two perspectives, there is little consensus regarding the proper 
role or function of HQ in the innovation process at the subsidiary level. Further, 
the research on HSR tends to neglect the impact of host context on the roles of 
HQ or subsidiaries (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Harzing and 
Noorderhaven, 2006). Finally, as compaed to large firms, SMEs tend to face a 
special challenge of developing the special capability for top-down venture due 
to the general lack of resources. 
Hence, there is a critical gap in the literature regarding the possible impact of 
HQ on BMI at the subsidiary level, especially in the context of top-down 
ventures engaged by SMEs. To fill this gap, the purpose of this study is to 
explore how SMEs’ HQ facilitates BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down 
ventures. As a comparative and longitudinal case study, this article focuses on 
simply one research question: How does SMEs’ HQ facilitate their subsidiaries’ 
BMI for top-down ventures, especially in an accelerated pattern? Consistent 
with the extant literature, we refer to business model (BM) as a system of highly 
interdependent business activities both within and beyond the formal 
boundaries of a focal firm (see Zott and Amit, 2010 for a review).  Further, we 
refer to HQ as the overall executive management responsible for the rest of the 
company as a whole at the corporate level, thus distinctive from the divisional 
HQ for only part of the company (Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Collis, Young, and 
Goold, 2007). Finally, given the lack of theories on HQ’s facilitation of 
subsidiary’s BMI as well as our focus on the process issues, we choose the 
method of case study for theory-building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990). 
The theoretically sampled cases for our study are six SMEs from Denmark, all 
of which have their subsidiaries that have engaged in BMI projects in China. 
The primary contribution of this study is the process framework where 
entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility at the HQ level serve as two salient 
facilitators of BMI at the subsidiary level via the mediating mechanisms of 
commitment and cooperation for accelerated top-down ventures. Further, this 
study identifies the opportunities for integrating several related research 
streams into one inter-disciplinary domain, which is international strategic 
entrepreneurship. 
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The rest of this study is organized into four sections. First, we will review the 
relevant literatures to seek for some theoretical guidance. Second, we will 
describe the method and the cases. Third, based upon the case evidence and 
comparing it with the extant literatures, we will present two sets of propositions 
about HQ’s facilitation of subsidiary’s BMI. Finally, we will discuss the emergent 
theoretical framework with its critical implications for future research, and we 
conclude at the end. 
 
THRORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Several literatures have the potential to provide needed insights into our 
research question. First, the literature on BMI is relevant to our research 
question. Even though there is no widely accepted definition of BM, there is one 
shared theme, i.e., value proposition (Amit and Zott, 2001; Zott and Amit, 2010). 
For the purpose of this study, we define BMI as a process where a firm adopts a 
novel value proposition to explore and exploit its resources, both current and 
future (cf. Gambardella and McGahan, 2010; Nelson, 1993; Teece, 2007). For 
most firms, BMI rarely happens automatically. Firms often introduce BMI due to 
contextual changes (e.g., competition or deregulation) or internal choices (e.g., 
to gain competitive advantages or to increase operating efficiency) 
(Wischnevsky, Damanpour and Me´ndez, 2010). BMI always requires the 
special capabilities to manage ambiguity and uncertainty in the process. More 
specifically, Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) proposed that BM design process 
should have five phases: mobilize, understand, design, implement, and manage. 
Across the entire process, two sets of salient parameters for BMI are design 
elements (e.g., content, structure and governance that describe the architecture 
of BMI) and design themes (e.g., novelty, lock-in, complementarities, and 
efficiency that describe the sources of BMI (Zott and Amit, 2010). However, 
there is no theory applicable directly to our research question concerning BMI 
by SMEs’ subsidiaries for top-down ventures, especially the role of HQ. We 
have to look elsewhere for the theoretical guidance. 
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Because we focus on the cross-border operation of SMEs, the literature on 
international business could be the second potential area to explore. 
Unfortunately, much of the literature on international business has little to do 
with our research question because it seldom covers the issue of BMI, let alone 
the refined issue of BMI by SMEs for top-down ventures. In the literature on 
international business in general and that on MNE in particular, the research on 
HSR seems the most relevant to our research question. The research on HSR 
focuses on explaining the roles or functions of HQ and subsidiaries to gain or 
strengthen competitive advantages either at the level of HQ or at the level of 
subsidiary, or both within a single multinational enterprise (MNE). Some 
scholars classify the roles of HQ into “entrepreneurial” (value creating) and 
“administrative” (loss preventing) (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Chandler 1991). In 
contrast, other scholars claim that it is difficult for MNEs’ HQ with its operations 
in a multitude of national contexts to perform both the loss-preventing 
(administrative) and value-creating (entrepreneurial) roles, so HQ is advised to 
concentrate on only one of the two functions (Ciabuschi et al, 2012; Doz and 
Prahalad, 1981). Due to information overload (Egelhoff, 1991, 2010), radical 
uncertainty (Forsgren and Holm, 2010), sheer ignorance (Forsgren et al., 2005), 
and “bounded reliability” (Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009), HQ tends to be ill-
informed of the unique contexts of its subsidiaries, thus prone to various errors 
in decision-making, such as the failure to recognize the potential synergy 
between subsidiaries, implementing ill-designed reward systems, and 
cannibalizing product offerings (Foss, Foss, and Nell, 2012). However, the 
impact of HQ on subsidiary’s innovation in general and BMI in particular has 
received little attention in the mainstream MNE theories (see Ciabuschi et al, 
2011). Further, the HSR research on the role of subsidiary often neglects the 
impact of host context (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Harzing and 
Noorderhaven, 2006). In other words, the mainstream research on MNEs has 
little to offer to offer concerning entrepreneurship in the contexts of top-down 
and bottom-up ventures. Hence, we fail to find much theoretical guidance from 
the mainstream literature on MNEs. 
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Finally, the literature of entrepreneurship is salient since BMI in general and 
BMI for top-down ventures in particular is directly related to entrepreneurship at 
its core. Entrepreneurship is often defined as the process of creating or 
recognizing market opportunity and pursuing it in a venture to innovatively apply 
the available resources (Timmons, 1994: 7). In the domain of entrepreneurship, 
the specific topics of international entrepreneurship (IE) and strategic 
entrepreneurship (SE) seem to be the most relevant to our research question. 
At the intersection of international business and entrepreneurship, IE refers to 
the discovery, enactment, evaluation, and exploitation of cross-border 
opportunities to create future goods and services (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). 
The problem of IE for our study is that IE tends to focus mostly on the so-called 
“born-global” (i.e., those new startup firms with any cross-border ventures in the 
early days of their business development) rather than the mature firms with top-
down ventures as the focus of our study (Autio, 2005; Keupp and Gassmann, 
2009; cf. Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; McDougall & Oviatt, 2000). Further, not 
only confined to the “born-global” new ventures, the IE research is also 
fragmented, inconsistent, and lacking in any unifying theories (see Keupp and 
Gassmann, 2009 for a review). Similarly, SE has its own share of problems. At 
the intersection between strategic management and entrepreneurship, SE 
refers to the entrepreneurial effort of mature firms, but SE seldom covers cross-
border ventures, let alone those top-down ventures engaged by SMEs (see Hitt, 
Ireland, Sirmon and Trahms, 2011; Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon, 2003, for reviews). 
However, due to the huge contextual distances between the established and 
emerging markets, we believe that the required effort for top-down ventures 
engaged by SMEs qualifies as entrepreneurial, but this type of entrepreneurship 
is so unique that it differentiates from the typical types of IE or SE. Hence, we 
fail to find much theoretical guidance from the literature on entrepreneurship.  
In sum, although the extant literature can give us some useful insights, we fail 
to find the relevant theoretical guidance for our study on the role of SMEs’ HQ 
to facilitate BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures. For top-down 
ventures engaged by SMEs, the contextual gaps or distances between the 
developed and emerging markets provide both unique opportunities and unique 
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threats (Hansen et al., 2011). To understand the specific roles of HQ to 
maximize the opportunities as well as minimize the threats, we need to develop 
new theoretical constructs and a process framework to fill in the gap in the 
literature. 
 
METHOD 
Building new theories from one or more cases is a research strategy to 
develop new theoretical constructs, propositions, and/or mid-range theories 
from case-based empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, creative 
insights often arise from the juxtaposition of contradictory or paradoxical 
evidence from cases (Pettigrew, 1990). In this research, we adopted the 
method of comparative and longitudinal case study for theory-building due to 
the lack of related theories and the specific focus on process issues which case 
study is best at (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990). 
A case study can involve either a single or multiple cases at various levels of 
analysis (Yin, 1994). Multiple cases are more effective than a single case 
because they enable collection of comparative data, and so are likely to yield 
more accurate and generalizable theory than a single case (Eisenhardt, 1991; 
Yin, 1994). Our research design is a multiple-case study that will allow the 
replication logic that treats a series of cases as a series of related laboratory 
experiments. Each case serves to confirm or disconfirm the inferences drawn 
from other cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). 
For the purpose of theory-building, we selected cases in line with the theoretical 
sampling, which means the cases are selected because they are particularly 
suitable for illuminating and extending possible causal links among constructs 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
The research setting is SMEs that are based in the developed economics but 
with their operations in the emerging economies as top-down ventures. SMEs 
play a critical role in international business but the actual internationalization 
process of SMEs has attracted little scholarly attention, thus in an urgent need 
for research (Lamb, Sandberg, and Liesch, 2011). To fill the gap, we selected 
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six SMEs based in Denmark with subsidiaries in China as their first market for 
top-down ventures (see Table 1 for more details). Their prior business models 
were designed for the developed markets, so they had to engage in BMI for 
their new top-down ventures in the emerging markets. In particular, they wanted 
to target the mid-end market segment in China as the most attractive given the 
potential size and fast growth (Tse, Russo, and Haddock, 2011). In this sense, 
the core of top-down venture lies in the target of mid-end market segment in the 
emerging markets. Due to the acute resource deficiency, SMEs tend to face the 
challenge of BMI bigger than that confronted by large MNEs. We focus on the 
process where SMEs’ HQ facilitates BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down 
ventures. BMI performance is measured by both effectiveness and pace of BMI 
at the subsidiary level. Following Daft (1998) and Ciabuschi and colleague 
(2011), we refer to the effectiveness and pace as the extent and the lapse of 
time BMI has been implemented with the initial market success, see Table 1). 
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Table 1 - Descriptions of Six Cases 
 
Firm Industry 
Founding 
Date(Year) 
Revenue in 
2010(M, 
DKK) 
Number of 
Employees 
global 
Established 
Subsidiary in 
China(Year) 
Interviews 
Performance 
of  BMI 
Key outcomes and 
evidence TMT Others 
DES  Pumps  1834 623 484 2005 
11 
High 
•Developed new product 
•Launched new product 2 9 
GAB Fabrics 1851 200 63 2003 
11 
High 
•Developed new product 
•Had the clear plan to 
Launch new product 
3 8 
MMI 
Beer 
installations 
1953 900 573 1994 
6 
Moderate 
•Designed new product 
prototype 2 4 
MAR Lights 1987 714 655 2003 
6 
Low •No significant progress 
2 4 
KRU 
Veterinary 
equipment 
1896 752 220 2006 
6 
Low 
•No significant progress 
2 4 
GNO 
Hearing 
Equipment 
1869 650 460 1994 
8 
Low 
•No significant progress 
2 6 
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Data Collection 
We collected our case data in two phases. In the first phase (i.e., during May-
August, 2011), we conducted a series of semi-structure interviews within each 
firm before the firm joined the project on BMI project sponsored by a private 
research group. The interviews were conducted with CEOs. The purpose of the 
initial interviews was to learn about the participating firm’s strategy for China 
and also seek the firm’s commitment on the BMI project. Interviewees were 
asked to describe their goals and plans of their BMI project, and also their 
challenges and barriers to their project. All of these six firms were committed to 
the special BMI for the Chinese mid-end markets across six key distinctive 
industries. 
All the six firms began to engage in their initial phase of BMI in October, 2011 
when the project was formally launched. Since then, we tracked the BMI 
progress in each firm. In the second phase, we collected two types of data: (1) 
regularly scheduled data, and (2) real-time data. To collect the regularly 
scheduled data, we relies on several different date sources, including: (1) 
quantitative and qualitative data from semi-structure interviews with CEOs and 
other informants in each quarter; (2) archival data, including innovation project 
reports and other internal documents; (3) phone calls, e-mails and follow-up 
interviews. The main source of data is semi-structured interviews within each of 
the six firms. We had two types of informants. The first was the top managers 
who were defined as those individuals have directly control over the BMI project 
and overall corporate strategy (e.g., chairman, CEO, general manager, and vice 
presidents). The second was the team members of the BMI projects who 
directly managed the project. Having the informants from multiple hierarchical 
levels can greatly reduce the potential information bias (Bingham and Haleblian, 
2012; Golden, 1992; Miller, Cardinal, and Glick, 1997). 
Each interview was conducted by two investigators, with one investigator 
primarily responsible for the interview, another investigator responsible for 
taking notes. After the interview, we followed the “24- hour rule” that the detailed 
interview notes and impressions were completed within one day after the 
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interview (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Yin, 1994). We also developed 
questionnaires to collect regularly scheduled data in each quarter, including 
such variables as BMI effectiveness, team performance, resource scarcity, 
decision-making process, and team leadership. 
Finally, to collect the real-time data, we conducted field observations in each 
month to track the BMI process. The first-hand observations helped us to learn 
how specific progresses occurred over time. As some scholars argued that to 
understand how innovation actually occured over time, it was necessary to 
supplement the regularly scheduled data collection with the intermittent real-
time data (e.g., Van de Ven, Angle, and Poole, 2000) 
 
Data Analysis 
Following the recommendations for multiple-case theory building (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), we used both within-case and cross-
case analyses with no priori hypotheses. We began by writing up each BMI 
story based on the interviews, surveys, and archival data we got for each case 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). Each BMI story provided the mapping of all 
relevant events in each BMI process. After the initial write-up of each BMI story, 
the co-authors discussed each BMI story as a team. For any missing details, we 
conducted additional interviews via either e-mails or Skype phone calls. Finally, 
we synthesized all the data into one finished BMI story. 
    For the within-case analysis, we took each specific case (in the form of BMI 
story) as the unit of analysis. At this stage, we focused on identifying the unique 
pattern of BMI process so as to achieve the good knowledge about each BMI 
story. From the emerging patterns out the within-case analysis, we developed 
our tentative theoretical constructs. Second, using the replication logic, we 
conducted the cross-case analysis. We used both tables and charts to look for 
the emergence of shared themes across multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). We 
iterated between theory and data to clarify our specific findings and theoretical 
arguments so as to refine our tentative theoretical constructs. Finally, these 
above activities helped yield our final theoretical framework.  
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Modeling the Impact of HQ on BMI at the Subsidiary Level 
Given our focus on the impact of HQ on BMI at the subsidiary level for top-
down ventures, we compared the case evidence with the relevant literatures to 
develop a set of two constructs toward a theoretical framework. Specifically, we 
identified the entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility of HQ as two primary 
facilitators or drivers for HQ to positively influence BMI at the subsidiary level. 
Entrepreneurial aspiration refers to the motive of HQ to enable BMI at the 
subsidiary level, while entrepreneurial flexibility refers to the capability of HQ to 
enable BMI at the subsidiary level. The two facilitators are consistent with the 
learning-based view of internationalization with the focus on the salient roles of 
learning motive and learning capability for a balance between exploration and 
exploitation in an accelerated process of internationalization. The two facilitators 
are also consistent with the awareness-motivation-capability perspective (Chen, 
1996, 2007). In particular, we emphasized the impact of HQ on the accelerated 
process of BMI as a salient criterion for BMI performance in addition to the other 
criterion of BMI’s effectiveness. 
 
Entrepreneurial Aspiration as the Primary Motive for BMI 
According to the extant literature, organizational aspiration is central to 
strategic decision-making, organizational change, and organizational 
performance (e.g., Ansoff, 1979; Cyert and March, 1963; Lant, 1992; Shinkle, 
2012). In this study, we found that BMI performance at the subsidiary level was 
influenced by HQ’s organizational aspiration as a major driver for the 
accelerated process of BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures. To 
accelerate BMI, entrepreneurial aspiration refers to the high expectation from 
HQ on its subsidiary to have an effective BMI for top-down ventures in a 
shortest time possible after its initial entry into the emerging market. Based on 
our case evidence, we found that the salient impact of entrepreneurial 
aspiration on BMI performance is mediated by the behavioral mechanism of 
commitment. Specifically, we found two components to constitute the 
mechanism of commitment from HQ and to reflect HQ’s entrepreneurial 
14 
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aspiration as it is applied to BMI: granting mandate, and prioritizing investment. 
It is worth noting that the theme of aspiration and commitment is the transfer of 
power and resources from HQ to key subsidiaries to enhance the autonomy of 
subsidiary. Further, in a feedback loop, the resulted BMI performance will be 
able to reciprocally facilitate the subsequent entrepreneurial aspiration of HQ in 
a virtuous cycle. The specific case evidence for entrepreneurial aspiration and 
the related mechanism of commitment is summarized with the representative 
quotes in Table 2. 
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Table 2 - Entrepreneurial Aspiration of HQ as Its Primary Motive 
 
Firms 
Overall 
Aspiration 
Primary Behaviors 
Specific Aspiration 
In Each Domain 
Representative Informants Quotes 
DES 
 
High 
 
Subsidiary Mandate High 
“DES China plays an important role in DES global market. HQ has strong 
ambition on Chinese markets. Our Chinese subsidiary has changed its 
mandate several times.” 
Prioritizing investment High 
“HQ has transferred its key resource to Chinese subsidiary. For example, we 
built global R&D center and product line in China. ” 
GAB 
 
High 
 
Subsidiary Mandate High 
“In 2004, the Chinese subsidiary mandate was resource seeking. .....This low 
mandate has been changed. Chinese subsidiary plays very important role in 
targeting middle market in China.” 
Prioritizing investment High “…we have transferred product development and product line to China.” 
MMI 
 
Moderate 
 
Subsidiary Mandate Moderate 
“The Chinese factory only focuses on manufacturing…Maybe in the future, we 
will change its mandate.” 
Prioritizing investment Moderate 
“We just closed our factory in China that has been rented for the last 5 years 
and make a new factory which is going to manufacture 1/3 of the production of 
MMI.” 
KRU Low Subsidiary Mandate Moderate 
“Chinese subsidiary mandate is only resource seeking. HQ lacks knowledge 
about Chinese market. They (top managers) do not have long term and 
16 
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  ambitious strategy and goal for China…” 
Prioritizing investment Low “Subsidiary lacks of resource, only focuses on buy resource in China.” 
GNO 
 
Moderate 
 
Subsidiary Mandate Moderate 
“The Chinese subsidiary is only sales office. We focus on sales and service. 
The mandate is very low. But the top managers have ambitions on Chinese 
market.”  
Prioritizing investment Low 
“The activities such as product development and manufacturing are retained 
in Denmark. Local production set-up is progressing well…” 
MAR 
 
Low 
 
Subsidiary Mandate Low 
“The innovation project did not have high priority…Our focus is to consolidate 
on our existing mature markets…The subsidiary was closed.” 
Prioritizing investment Low 
“…we are running the project at low resources,…as there are other more 
important priorities we should to do.” 
17 
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Granting Mandate to Subsidiary  
In the six firms, the performance of BMI of DES and GAB is higher than other 
four firms. For example, both DES and GAB have identified their value 
propositions and designed their new products for middle markets. In contrast, 
the four other companies (MMI, GNO, MAR, and KRU) in BMI have not made 
significant progress. Based on our data, we found that DES and GAB explicitly 
show their shared feature of granting mandate to subsidiary in China. 
A good example is GAB firm. In 2003, following its big global customers, GBA 
established its subsidiary in Beijing. From 2003 to 2010, the mandate of GAB 
China was to sell premium products to its old customers, and to purchase raw 
materials for HQ. Due to the high growth of local market, GAB China got more 
and more attention from the HQ. In 2011, the HQ in Denmark upgraded the 
mandate of GAB China. They started to design new business model at 
subsidiary in which the portfolio of products of GBA China would cover 
customers both on high end market and middle end market. As one manager 
said, 
“Now, HQ has high ambitious goals for the Chinese market. The growth of 
local market is very fast. Within the last 7 years, GBA China had not 
developed any new product. I believe it is related to HQ strategy for China. 
Under the new mandate, GAB china will focus on both old customers and 
new local customers. We will develop the low price product for Chinese 
middle market.” 
Due to the enhancement of GAB China positioning, it got more support and 
resource from HQ on the new business model innovation. For example, the 
designer from HQ joined the local team, worked with local designers, and 
visited local customers with Chinese employees. These activities accelerated 
the process of new business model. 
In MAR firm, the situation on Chinese subsidiary is different. In 2003, MAR 
built a factory in China and produced products for global market. MAR’s 
business principles are very much based on western standards. In 2011, MAR 
managers at HQ saw great potential in emerging markets and were aware of 
18 
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the need of a new product line targeted for the Chinese middle markets. As one 
manager said: 
“Designing new business model is not only necessary for being successful in 
China, we also experience that we lost projects in the western countries 
because our products are too expensive. We see growth potential in the 
emerging countries. However, our main commitment and strategic focus is 
not sufficient for China as compared to the other countries.” 
Although the top managers at HQ saw potential growth in China, they lack of 
commitment and knowledge about Chinese customers, even they 
misunderstood and complained Chinese market when MAR faced big challenge 
in China. For example, due to the weak of the protection of IPR, MAR’s 
products were copied by local competitors. For many MNEs, most of them have 
faced the same questions. Normally, the best way is to combat the piracy in 
cooperation with local government. In fact, MAR did not take any actions to 
solve the issue to protect the brand. In contrast, it closed the subsidiary in China 
in 2012, and weakened the mandate of the subsidiary. Compare to other 
countries, Chinese market has low priority. These actions slowed down the 
process of its new business innovation for Chinese middle market.  
 
Prioritizing Investment to Subsidiary 
According to Zott and Amit (2010), business model is a system of 
interdependent activities that transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries. 
The activity system enables the firm, in concert with its partners, to create value 
and also to appropriate a share of that value. For SMEs, the goal of business 
model innovation at subsidiary is to exploit a business opportunity by creating 
value for local customers and partners. In order to create the value and 
accelerate the process of BMI, prioritizing investment to subsidiary in host 
country is very salient. We found that DES and GAB who have better BMI 
performance than other four firms explicitly show their shared feature of 
prioritizing investment to subsidiary in China. 
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A good case is DES firm. In 2005, DES built its subsidiary in Suzhou, China. 
Top managers at HQ have strong aspirations, clear and long term strategy for 
Chinese markets, and gave prioritizing investment to China. In around 2009, 
DES built R＆D department for global market in China. Until now, DES has 
transferred the main value chain activities to Chinese subsidiary. All of these 
activities are very important for its business model innovation. As one manager 
said, 
“If the HQ lack of ambition on Chinese market, it is impossible to transfer key 
resource and knowledge to China. DES is different. The HQ has long term 
strategy for China. It has invested a lot of money in China. Now, we are 
building another big factory in China. ” 
Due to DES has built the whole value chain in China, it has resource and 
capability to perform its business model innovation. Within the six firms, the 
speed of process of BMI in DES is the fastest.  
A comparative case is KRU. The Chinese subsidiary only focuses on the 
sourcing of existing products in China. The HQ reviews China as one good 
sourcing platform, ignores other emerging new opportunities. The HQ does not 
intend transfer key value chain activities to China, even the HQ sales are not 
willing to put local people on the task, and the HQ sales persons do not have 
the right understanding when they get to China, they spend far too little time on 
China to understand the market, the sales & distribution and the customers. 
Concerning the new business model, the speed is so slowly. Within around 11 
months, they have still not decided upon what product assortment to go for 
China. As one manager said, 
“I had made a proposal for the HQ and Board in Denmark showing what it 
would take to increase sales and still get a satisfactory contribution. HQ 
management and the board nodded, but no action or decision has been 
made yet, which frustrated me a bit. …I just don’t like to let this opportunity go. 
So many opportunities for KRU in China… I believe a change in the HQ 
needs to be made to innovation.” 
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In our study, all the six cases demonstrate the salience of entrepreneurial 
aspiration in BMI, and the salient impact of entrepreneurial aspiration on BMI 
performance is mediated by the behavioral mechanism of commitment. 
Granting mandate and prioritizing investment are two important components to 
constitute the mechanism of commitment from HQ and to reflect HQ’s 
entrepreneurial aspiration as it is applied to BMI. A key observation is that, if the 
HQs have low commitment they do not intent to transfer of power and resources 
from HQ to key subsidiaries to enhance the autonomy of subsidiary. 
For example, the BMI performance in GNO is very low. The general manager 
in subsidiary has changed his ideas several times. The main reason is that, 
although the HQ has high aspiration, HQ lacked commitment on the new 
business model and refused to transfer key resource to China. As the manager 
said, 
“I really believe that HQ has high aspiration on Chinese markets. But, HQ 
lacks of commitment on new business model because the top managers 
worry about the risk of new business. So that HQ refused to transfer power to 
subsidiary. We do not have resource to test and try our ideas about new 
business model.” 
For SMEs, Chinese markets are characterized by high growth, uncertainty, 
and risky environment. High economic growth and huge market opportunities 
are easily to increase HQ aspirations on subsidiary in China. But, high 
uncertainty and risk are easily decline HQ commitment on new business model. 
For the successful SMEs in BMI, granting mandate and prioritizing investment 
represent a higher level of commitment. 
In sum, we found that HQ’s entrepreneurial aspiration, as reflected by the 
mediating mechanisms of granting mandate and prioritizing investment as the 
components of commitment, facilitated BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down 
ventures. For SMEs, the primary reason for the entrepreneurial aspiration of HQ 
to facilitate BMI at the subsidiary level in an effective and fast manner is that 
entrepreneurial aspiration triggers the mediating mechanisms of granting 
mandate and prioritizing investment toward the autonomy of subsidiary, which 
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are tied to risk-taking strategic reorientation (Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas, 1988; Shinkle, 2012). Hence, HQ’s entrepreneurial aspiration plays a 
salient role in strategic orientation, which can be defined as a major shift in the 
form, quality, or state in a firm over time that will alter the firm’s alignment with 
its context, both internally and externally  (Hutzschenreuter,  Kleindienst, and 
Greger, 2012). In fact, strategic orientation can be taken as a form of BMI. 
Specifically, each BMI to reflect a contextual shift defines strategic orientation, 
which is a critical decision for a mature firm, especially mature SMEs, and 
perhaps the most difficult decision for the top executives who are responsible 
for designing the right business model for their firms (Zott and Amit, 2010). 
However, the special challenge to mature firms is that BMI is often confronted 
by the strong resistance due to the conflict between new and prevailing 
business models, especially when the underlying configuration of assets is 
embedded in the prevailing business model (Zott and Amit, 2010). Further, the 
resistance will be much stronger if the new business model involves a high-level 
uncertainty (Chesbrough, 2010). According to Chesbrough (2010), whether the 
biggest challenge is obstruction (as in the case of paradigm conflict between 
new and old business models) or confusion (as in the case of high uncertainty 
for the new business model), the only way moving forward is the mechanism of 
commitment to experimentation. “Undertaking active tests to probe nascent 
markets with new potential configurations of the elements of a business model 
can allow a firm to learn ahead of the rest of the market, and to begin to 
generate the new data that can power its change process” (Chesbrough, 2010: 
359). This view is consistent with the notion of exploration as a path-breaking 
search for innovation (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991), which is at the 
core of entrepreneurship in general (Teece, 2007). In particular, in the above 
two scenarios, SMEs are more vulnerable that large firms due to the lack of 
resources to bear the possible negative impact of BMI. For SMEs, 
entrepreneurial aspiration and the mediating mechanism of commitment are 
more salient than for large firms. 
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Proposition 1: For SMEs, the high entrepreneurial aspiration of HQ will 
accelerate BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures in the host 
emerging market. 
Proposition 2: For SMEs, the high entrepreneurial aspiration of HQ will 
accelerate BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures via the mediating 
mechanism of commitment (specifically via the sub-mechanisms of (a) 
granting mandate and (b) prioritizing investment). 
 
Reciprocal Feedback from Subsidiary to HQ 
    According to behavioral theory, organizations adjust their aspirations based 
on past experience and performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Lant and Shapira , 
2008; Shinkle, 2012). In this study, there are some evidences to support the 
behavioral theory. We found that the resulted BMI performance at subsidiary 
level reciprocally facilitates the subsequent entrepreneurial aspiration of HQ in a 
virtuous cycle. 
    Concerning their primary aspirations and subsidiary mandate, all of the six 
cases explicitly show their shared feature of incentives or reasons for entering 
and targeting the Chinese market which were to seek resource in China, to 
export and sell their existing premium products in European market to the 
Chinese high-end segment. In general, all the firms have had three different 
approaches to enter to China. The first one is “customer driven approach” by 
which the companies have entered China to follow their big global customers. 
For example, DES, MMI, and GAB have all started up in the high-end segment 
delivering existing premium products to their customers. The second one is 
“market driven approach” by which the companies have entered China to exploit 
the huge growth opportunity. For example, MAR, and GNO have entered the 
market by finding new local customers and selling their existing high-end 
products to them. KRU used the third approach that is called as “source driven 
approach” by which the KRU sought resource for its HQ in China. 
    A key observation is that the HQs entrepreneurial aspiration on Chinese 
market is one key determinant on the evolution of subsidiary mandate and 
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subsidiary priority in SMEs global network. Within the process of BMI, some 
firms’ HQs constantly and dynamically have adjusted their aspirations based on 
their subsidiaries’ performance. For example, firms such as DES, GAB, and 
MAR have adjusted their subsidiaries mandates and priorities based on their 
performance in Chinese markets.  
    Based on high BMI performance, both DES and GAB have increased their 
aspirations level on Chinese markets.  In their new business model, they 
develop the portfolio of products that cover customers both on high end market 
and middle end market. At the same time, subsidiaries have got priorities from 
HQ. As one director of R&D at DES noted,  
  “DES China has good situation and priority in DES global market because 
we have obtained   good performance in China. Chinese market is huge. Now, 
we are in a virtuous cycle. Better performance, …,higher aspiration, …,and 
more investment.” 
A contrasting case is MAR. Due to bad performance in China, MAR declined 
HQ’s aspiration level on BMI, and positioned the business model project as 
“learning project” in which it can learn how to target the Chinese market. So, 
MAR is running the business model project at low resources, as there are other 
more important priorities. As one manager said, 
“The new business model project does not have high priority at this 
moment. Our focus is to consolidate on our existing mature markets, and to 
get a positive cash flow here.” 
        To summarize, in MAR, past performance in China shapes its strategic 
behavior, which in turn influences its future performance of BMI. 
In sum, we found that subsidiary’s BMI performance influences the HQ’s 
aspiration. Our findings support the domain views that recognize historical 
performance as an antecedent to aspiration levels and assume organizations, 
or more precisely their managers, learn from experience (Shinkle, 2012). 
Recent work also acknowledges that commitment may decline, or even cease, 
if performance and prospects are not sufficiently promising (Benito et al., 2009; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Due to big gap between developed markets and 
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emerging markets, SMEs have faced big challenged in the BMI. If BMI 
performance is judged as below aspirations, SMEs are expected to select new 
strategies and adjust their aspirations to increase performance. The dominant 
view of subsidiary mandates also shows that the subsidiary mandates are the 
outcome of a process of subsidiary evolution (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). 
For example, Hansen et al (2011) reviewed the prior researches and argued 
that the evolution of subsidiary mandate is from low commitment to high 
commitment; from resource seeking-via market seeking - to efficiency and, 
eventually, asset seeking; from competence exploitation to competence 
creation; and from low linkage to deep linkage intensity with local industry 
(Dunning and Narula, 2004; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Scott-Kennel and 
Endevick, 2006). Overall, these observations lead to our proposition. 
Proposition 3: For SMEs, the high BMI performance at the subsidiary level in 
the host emerging market will positively affect the subsequent entrepreneurial 
aspiration of HQ concerning the host market as increasingly more strategic.  
 
Entrepreneurial Flexibility as the Primary Capability for BMI 
The research stream on organizational flexibility shows that flexibility creates 
special values for firms (Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Lee and Makhija, 2009; 
Tang and Tikoo, 1999), and operational flexibility is often one of the key goals 
for internationalization (Fisch and Zschoche, 2012). In our study, we found a 
special type of organizational flexibility beyond the typical operational one, i.e., 
the flexibility for BMI, which we refer to as entrepreneurial flexibility in contrast 
to the notion of organizational routine (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011; Nelsen 
and Winter, 1982; Pentland and Rueter, 1994). More specifically, we define 
entrepreneurial flexibility as the special capability of nimbly adapting to major 
contextual changes (cf. De Toni and Tonchia, 2005). Based on our case 
evidence, we found that the impact of entrepreneurial flexibility on BMI 
performance is mediated by the behavioral mechanism of cooperation. 
Specifically, we found three components to constitute the mechanism of 
cooperation from HQ and reflect HQ’s entrepreneurial flexibility as it is applied 
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to BMI: cooperative strategic decision-making, cooperative product 
development, and cooperative HRM. Further, in a feedback loop, the resulted 
BMI performance will be able to reciprocally affect the subsequent 
entrepreneurial flexibility of HQ in a virtuous cycle. The specific case evidence 
for entrepreneurial flexibility and the associated mechanism of cooperation is 
summarized with the representative quotes in Table 3. It is worth noting that 
entrepreneurial flexibility differs from entrepreneurial aspiration with two 
distinctive themes. While transferring both power and resources is the theme for 
entrepreneurial aspiration via the mediating mechanism of commitment, sharing 
both power and resources is the theme for entrepreneurial flexibility via the 
mechanism of cooperation. This distinction bears key implications for HSR as a 
special type of partnership beyond the traditional argument for subsidiary 
autonomy, which will be discussed later. 
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Table 3 -  The Capability of HQ: Policy Flexibility 
Firms 
Overall 
Flexibility 
Policy Domain 
Specific Flexibility 
In Each Domain 
Representative Informants Quotes 
DES 
 
High 
 
Cooperative Strategic 
Decision-Making  
High 
“..... innovation needs flexibility. At our HQ, the process of decision making is 
very flexible. ..... DES China has enough resource and power to design, test, 
and revise the new business model.” 
Cooperative Product 
Development 
Middle 
“....., Chinese R&D has the capability to design new products for local 
customers. R&D at HQ makes the product strategy for global market.” 
Cooperative HRM High 
“The HR process at HQ is very flexible. In China, we have local HR 
department. We can hire, evaluate, and fire the employees. It is very important 
for our innovation because we can make fast decision on HR policy.” 
GAB 
 
High 
 
Cooperative Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Middle 
“The process of decision making at HQ is complex, not very flexible. It is ok. 
Comparing to local competitor, the decision making speed is very slow.” 
Cooperative Product 
Development 
Middle 
“Our tactic of product development is ‘customer driven.’ ..... During the whole 
process, we involved designers from HQ and our local customers in each 
stage”. 
Cooperative HRM High 
“Concerning big decision, we share power. We also can make HR policy by 
ourselves. And we can hire, and fire employees. The HR process is flexible in 
Denmark.” 
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MMI 
 
Low 
 
Cooperative Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Low 
“The project manager has no any autonomy…Top managers controlled the 
project.” 
Cooperative Product 
Development 
Low 
“...they (designers) at HQ do not know what are the customers’ real needs.”   
Cooperative HRM Low 
“In China, MMI has no local HR department. The HQ makes HR any policies 
for subsidiary.” 
KRU 
 
Low 
 
Cooperative Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Middle 
“...they (managers at HQ) spent far too little time on China to understand the 
market, the sales & distribution and the customers. They have still not decided 
upon what product assortment to go for in China!” 
Cooperative Product 
Development 
Low 
“KRU is only a broker who sells the product…The process of product 
development is complex.” 
Cooperative HRM Low 
“Sales not progressing…It is the wrong people who are the main cause. HQ 
sales are not willing to put local people on the task, and the HQ sales persons 
do not have the right understanding when they get to China…” 
GNO 
 
Low 
 
Cooperative Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Middle 
“The only one thing what I can do is waiting. The decision speed is so slow…  
They try to control everything by ERP system.” 
Cooperative Product 
Development 
Low 
“The process of product development is managed and controlled by HQ…It is 
a complete copy-paste solution, not adapted at all to local conditions. HQ 
fears that they lose control of quality…” 
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Cooperative HRM Low 
“I have no power to hire new employee and to adjust HR policy at subsidiary. I 
want to build a new team to research how to innovation the new business 
model, but, I can’t do it because the manager at HQ did not agree with me”. 
MAR 
 
Low 
 
Cooperative Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Low 
“No mechanism to share information and power with subsidiary. HQ makes 
main decisions.” 
Cooperative Product 
Development 
Low 
“The principles of production development are very much based on western 
standards.” 
Cooperative HRM Low 
“The policy of HRM is rigid. It is limited the managers power, and slowed down 
our innovation speed.” 
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Cooperative Strategic Decision-Making  
    For SMEs, how to make flexible and fast strategic decisions at HQ level is a 
big challenge. In general, SMEs have not built the total value chain in host 
country. The subsidiary in host country only has partial functions such as sales, 
purchase resource. The HQ remains some key functions such as product 
design, manufacture, and human resource management. In the process of 
business model innovation at subsidiary level, the majority decisions are made 
by the HQ executives who are far away from customers. Managers in the host 
country who understand market deeply have no space and resource to make 
any strategic decisions.  
    A good example is DES firm whose speed of BMI is fast. Within only 10 
months, DES not only lunched its new product, but also sold more than 200 
units. The strategic decision-making speed is also fast because it has 
established a cooperative decision-making mechanism between HQ and 
subsidiary. As one manager said, 
  “I believe that innovation needs flexibility. At our HQ in Denmark, the 
process of decision making is very flexible. We share information about 
strategic decision, and cooperate to make strategic decisions. This 
mechanism helps DES China has enough resource and power to design, 
test, and revise the new business model.” 
A contrasting case is GNO firm. The general manager in host country has 
strong entrepreneurship and good experiences for Chinese market. In the 
beginning of business model innovation project, he had strong confidence on it 
and believed that GNO could design novel business model for middle market 
because he had so many good ideas and insights on the new business model. 
Unfortunately, he can’t share power on new business model and has no 
resource or power to test his insights, to convert ideas to actions and to 
accomplish plans because the top managers at HQ try to control everything. 
The long, complex and rigid decision making process at HQ limited his actions 
for innovate new business model. As the manager said, 
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   “The only one thing what I can do is waiting. The decision speed is so 
slow. Maybe, they (top managers at HQ) do not trust me. I can’t share power. 
They try to control everything at Chinese office by ERP system. I have no 
resource, money, people to try, test and implement. So, you can understand 
why the procedure of innovation is very slow.” 
This is a very interesting phenomenon. From the general manager 
perspective, he explained the reason why he has no opportunity to share power 
is that top managers from HQ don’t trust him. In contrast, when we interviewed 
one top manager at HQ, he said, “Definitely, we trust him. It is no doubt. 
According our decision making process, we just need much more data and 
evidence to decide if we can do it.” 
There is a significant conflict between HQ and subsidiary on how to make 
strategic decision quickly. On one hand, top managers claim much more 
information, much more detail actions plans, and much more performance 
commitment from general manage in host country to support their decisions 
because they lack knowledge about local market. On the other hand, for the 
general manager at local subsidiary, it is very difficult to obtain actions in detail 
and performance commitment because the environment is complex and 
uncertain. The general manger believed that the important thing for BMI is to try 
and test ideas.  
 
Cooperative Product Development 
    Design new product or services for customers is the key factor for business 
model innovation. Based on our data, we found that flexibility product 
development processes at HQ are very important to business model innovation 
at subsidiary level.  A good example is GAB. Adopting a highly flexible policy for 
product development, GAB built a multinational cooperative design team which 
included two members from the local design department, one designer from HQ, 
and one member from the local sales department. The product development 
strategy at GAB was described as “working with key customers.” As one 
member stated: 
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    “We have developed a cooperative product development mechanism 
between HQ and our subsidiary. Our tactic of product development is 
‘customer driven.’ We got many ideas about product design from our key 
customers, and we tested the product prototypes with them. During the 
whole process, we involved our customers at each stage”. 
        In GAB, although the HQ didn’t decentralize to subsidiary on new product 
decision, its cooperative mechanism increased the flexibility and response 
speed about customer needs. Because the designers from HQ visited and 
interviewed Chinese customers several times with local members, They got so 
many useful information and knowledge from local market, and could 
understand Chinese market in deeply. As one team member said, “Designers at 
HQ is very important for the product innovation. Their role looks as an 
information bridge between HQ and Chinese office. With their help, we can 
communicate and share information with Denmark office very quickly.” Overall, 
“cooperative product development mechanism” accelerates the business model 
innovation process in GAB.   
A contrasting case is MMI, where product designers and engineers at home 
country have no any experiences about Chinese market. They also have no 
motivation to go to China and visit customers, and just claim information about 
customers from sales people. Based on very limited information, they 
developed one new product to target market. The solution looks perfect, but, 
unfortunately, no customer wants to buy it. As one manager said,  
“They (designers) believe the new product can help customers to solve 
their problems. In fact, they do not know what are the customers’ real needs.”   
        In MMI, there is no local designer in China, and no cooperative product 
development mechanism with local subsidiary. Due to the designers at HQ lack 
of information and experiences about local market, the solutions is 
“technological driven” or “product driven”, not “customer driven” or “market 
driven”. Based on our observation, the product designers who obsess their 
technology scarcely change themselves. The result of refusing to change is 
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developing rigid product development process in which the firm could not 
identify the real needs of customers. 
 
Cooperative HRM 
    For SMEs, the flexibility of human resource management at HQ is very 
important for BMI at subsidiary. Based on our data, we found that the firms who 
have high performance on BMI have established cooperative HRM mechanism 
between HQ and subsidiary. Due to big institution distance between the home 
and host countries, how to build cooperative HRM system to support BMI at 
subsidiaries is a big challenge for SMEs.  
DES has overcome this challenge and viewed the institution distance as 
strategic opportunity to gain competitive advantage. In order to support 
subsidiary innovation, HQ has changed the process of HRM and improved its 
flexibility. First, HR department focuses on big decision only and retains the 
responsibility for hiring the top manager at subsidiary and evaluating the top 
managers’ performance. Second, DES built local HR department in China which 
is responsible for the formulation of local human resources management 
policies. As one manager said, 
“The HR process at HQ is very flexible. For big decision, we have 
cooperative mechanism between Chinese office and HQ. In subsidiary, we 
have local HR department. We can hire, evaluate, and fire the employees. It 
is very important for our innovation because we can make fast decision on 
HR policy.”  
In GNO, the rigid HR policy has slowed down the performance of BMI. 
Because GNO focuses on very niche market in China and its products are very 
special, it is very difficult for the employees who have few experiences to sell 
them. As one informant said, “Special products need special people. We need 
to hire local talents who have special knowledge and good experiences to sell 
our products.” In order to accelerate the BMI, the general manager tried to hire 
experienced professionals and build a local team to operate the innovation 
project. However, he was unable to fulfill its wish to set up the team. The 
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general manager explained that the main reason why he could not build local 
team for the project. 
“Concerning HRM, we have no cooperative mechanism to share power and 
resource. I have no power to hire new employee and to adjust HR policy at 
subsidiary. I want to build a new team to research how to innovation the new 
business model, but, I can’t do it because the manager at HQ did not agree 
with me”.  
A key observation is that the difference of institutions between Denmark and 
China constrains the flexibility of HRM process at HQ. GNO HQ is very 
concerned about hiring too many employees in China because it is very difficult 
to fire people in Denmark. But, in China, it is different. As one manger said, 
“Compare to Denmark, you can much more easily hire and fire people out here 
(China), and they (employees) are still cheap. So risk is rather low”. But GNO 
HQ does not understand the HR policies in China. Due to concerns about the 
risk of employment, GNO headquarter retains the power of hiring new employee. 
In sum, we found that HQ’s cooperative sharing of power and resources in 
the areas of strategic decision-making, product development, and HRM 
facilitated BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures. For SMEs, the 
primary reason for entrepreneurial flexibility to facilitate BMI at the subsidiary 
level is that flexibility enables HQ and subsidiaries to share power and 
resources so as to leverage their respective strengths for synergy at the 
network level. This special theme of sharing power and resources between HQ 
and subsidiaries is critical for SMEs in particular and all firms in general (cf. 
Andersson and Forsgren, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Keupp et al, 2011; 
Tavares and Young, 2006). Putting together, the theme of transferring power 
and resources from HQ to subsidiaries can effectively supplement the theme of 
sharing power and resources between HQ and subsidiaries to delineate the 
unique contribution of this study toward a process framework with the overall 
duality theme of accelerated learning, which will be discussed later. 
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Proposition 4: For SMEs, the high entrepreneurial flexibility of HQ will 
accelerate BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures in the host 
emerging market. 
Proposition 5: For SMEs, the high entrepreneurial flexibility of HQ will 
accelerate BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures via the mediating 
mechanism of cooperation (specifically via the sub-mechanisms of (a) 
cooperative strategic decision-making, (b) cooperative product development, 
and (c) cooperative HRM. 
 
Reciprocal Feedback from Subsidiary to HQ 
   In this study, we found that flexibility is critical organizational competence for 
achieving and maintaining competitive advantage and superior performance in 
turbulent business environment. The successful SMEs in BMI increased their 
entrepreneurial flexibility to keep pace with market evolution as well as to 
respond rapidly to unpredictable and unexpected market conditions. There is 
one important question is how and why some firms can improve their flexibility 
whereas others cannot. Some prior search suggests that flexibility is 
constrained not only by resource but also by the ways a firm uses the resource 
(Sanchze, 1995). Based on our data, we found that the resulted BMI 
performance at subsidiary level reciprocally facilitates the subsequent 
entrepreneurial flexibility of HQ in a virtuous cycle. 
The relevant literature regards organizational learning (OL) as a key strategic 
capability for explaining why successful firms surpass competitors (Bapuji and 
Crossan, 2004). In the interactive relationship between entrepreneurial flexibility 
at HQ and BMI performance at subsidiary, the knowledge that SMEs learned 
from the innovation process plays an important role. SMEs need knowledge and 
capabilities of defining, configuring (identifying and structuring), and deploying 
existing resources through organizational systems and processes (Liu, Li, and 
Wei, 2009). The greater a firm's accumulated experience and knowledge, the 
greater its ability to continually restructure and respond effectively to the 
modern economic environment (Kenny, 2006).  
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Our data show that if SMEs got enough knowledge from the innovation 
process, they intend to change their organizational process to improve flexibility. 
Fox example, GAB and DES have learned much more knowledge about 
Chinese markets during the process of design new business model. Based on 
their knowledge, the changed their processes at HQ to support subsidiaries. In 
contrast, HQs at MMI and MAR lack of knowledge about Chinese markets, they 
refused to change their rigid process at HQ. These findings link to the prior 
researches which have suggested that SMEs face a multitude of different and 
conflicting institutional pressures, as they attempt to adjust and transfer 
organizational processes or practices that reflect their unique core competences 
and knowledge to the foreign subsidiaries to gain competitive advantage 
(Szulanski, 1996; Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Knowledge about 
host country can help them ease these change pressures. Overall, these 
observations lead to our proposition. 
Proposition 6: For SMEs, the high BMI performance at the subsidiary level in 
the host emerging market will positively affect the subsequent entrepreneurial 
flexibility of HQ concerning the host market as increasingly more strategic.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
BMI is a relatively new research area across diverse fields of management 
research, especially those of strategic management, entrepreneurship, and 
international business. To obtain competitive advantages and create values in 
top-down ventures, SMEs from the developed economies need to develop a 
novel business model for the emerging markets due to the large contextual 
distances or gaps between the emerging and developed economies (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012; Ghemawat, 2001). The HQ of SMEs plays a central role in BMI 
at the subsidiary level, yet there is little research on this topic. To fill this gap, 
the primary contribution of this study is a novel process framework. 
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A Process Framework for HQ’s Impact on Subsidiary’s BMI 
A primary contribution of this study is an emergent process framework for 
HQ to facilitate BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down ventures. Figure 1 
represents this framework with three sets of interrelated constructs. First, the 
entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility of HQ will facilitate BMI at the 
subsidiary level. Second, the above two facilitators function via the mediating 
mechanisms of commitment (granting mandate and prioritizing investment) and 
cooperation (cooperative strategic decision-making, cooperative product 
development and cooperative HRM). Third, the resulted BMI performance will 
have a reciprocal effect on entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility, thus a 
reverse impact from subsidiary to HQ. While the prior research focuses on the 
knowledge and capability of HQ to affect subsidiary performance (e.g., 
Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Foss, 2002; Goodall and Roberts, 2003; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993). This is especially true for the model of internationalization 
process (Johanson and Vahlne, 2003, 2006). In contrast, the framework 
stresses the role of entrepreneurial aspiration as the motive for top-down 
venture, which is as critical as, if not more than, the capability. Consistent with 
the learning-based view of internationalization, our framework focuses on the 
roles of both motive and capability for top-down ventures. Further, in contrast to 
the typical focus on the separated roles of HQ and subsidiary in the mainstream 
research, our framework points out the integrated and shared roles of HQ and 
subsidiary as cooperative partners. 
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Figure 1 
A Process Framework of HQ’s Impact on Subsidiary’s BMI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, our framework consists of three sets of constructs. First, 
entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility serve as the primary facilitators for BMI 
for top-down ventures. Our case evidence showed that HQ’s entrepreneurial 
aspiration and flexibility could accelerate BMI at the subsidiary level by 
triggering the mechanisms of commitment and cooperation. These findings link 
to the prior research on organization aspiration, which suggests that aspiration 
is central to strategic decision- making, strategic choice, organizational design, 
organizational growth, and innovation (e.g., Ansoff, 1979; Cyert & March, 1963; 
Lant, 1992; Massini, Lewin, and Greve, 2005; Shinkle, 2012). Further, the 
entrepreneurial flexibility of HQ also influences BMI performance. Based on the 
resource-based review (RBV), flexibility is divided into resource flexibility and 
coordination flexibility (Sanchez, 1995, 1997). However, the view of dynamic 
capability maintains that the RBV has not adequately explained how firms 
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achieve competitive advantages in a dynamic context (Liu, Li, and Wei, 2009). It 
is argued that a firm must constantly enhance its capabilities to remain 
dynamically competitive, thus necessary to explore new resources beyond 
exploiting extant resources (Li et al., 2008; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). 
Compared with large firms, SMEs are more resource deficient. In this study, we 
found that HQ’s flexibility is a special type of core competency (De Toni and 
Tonchia, 2005), especially salient to an accelerated BMI performance. 
Second, we further found that entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility only 
serve as the intended goals that have to be transformed into behavioral acts via 
the mediating mechanisms of commitment and cooperation. Specifically, the 
mechanism of commitment consists of the specific components of granting 
mandate and prioritizing investment, while the mechanism of cooperation 
consists of the specific components of cooperative strategic decision-making, 
cooperative product investment, and cooperative HRM. The mediating 
mechanisms with their specific components open the black boxes of 
entrepreneurial aspiration as the motive for top-down ventures and 
entrepreneurial flexibility as the capability for top-down ventures. 
Third, we finally found the interactive relationship between HQ and subsidiary. 
Specifically, the higher BMI performance at the subsidiary level can reciprocally 
enhance the subsequent level of entrepreneurial aspiration and flexibility at the 
HQ level. This finding broadens the traditional focus on either the role of HQ or 
the role of subsidiary by balancing and integrating both roles in a single 
framework. In particular, our findings suggest that HSR is not only about 
subsidiary autonomy or HQ control, but also about HQ-subsidiary cooperation 
as a partnership (cf. Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Harzing and Noorderhaven, 
2006; Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Szulanski, 1996). This finding 
also implies that the anchor of learning and knowledge is not confined to 
subsidiary or HQ as often assumed; rather, it is the interaction and 
interdependence between HQ and subsidiary that delineate the scope of firm-
wide learning and knowledge (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998), which bears far-
reaching implications for future research on HSR. In sum, our new process 
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framework identifies the causal links between three sets of constructs in the 
context of top-down ventures.  
 
Implications for Future Research toward International Strategic 
Entrepreneurship  
The primary contribution of this study is the development of a process 
framework concerning the role of HQ in BMI at the subsidiary level for top-down 
ventures. This contribution bears five major implications for future research. 
First, the framework bears an implication for enriching the research on IE in 
three areas. Initially, the framework expands the traditional narrow focus of IE 
on startup firms toward the broader scope to cover both new startups and 
mature firms. Further, the framework can sharpen the traditional broad 
coverage of cross-border ventures toward the narrower focus on only top-down 
and bottom-up ventures as truly entrepreneurial in the cross-border context. 
Finally, the framework highlights the salience of BMI and exploration to 
entrepreneurship, which the extant research on IE largely neglects. 
Second, the framework bears an implication for enriching the research on SE 
also in three areas. Initially, the framework expands the traditional narrow focus 
of SE on domestic ventures toward the broader scope to cover both domestic 
and international ventures. Further, the framework can also expand the 
assumed coverage of large firms toward a broader coverage of both large firms 
and SMEs. Finally, the framework highlights the salience of BMI and exploration 
to entrepreneurship, which the extant research on SE largely neglects. 
Third, the framework bears an implication for the learning-based view of 
internationalization in three areas. Initially, the framework can help specify the 
distinctive roles of HQ and subsidiary in their respective learning processes 
rather than mixing up the distinctive roles and processes related to different 
learning motives and capabilities. For example, the anchor of operational 
learning lies at the subsidiary level with subsidiary as the primary agent of 
operational learning, while the anchor of strategic learning lies at the HQ level 
with HQ as the primary agent of strategic learning. Further, it is the mutual trust 
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between HQ and subsidiary that define the overall relationship quality between 
HQ and subsidiary, as reflected in the mechanisms of commitment and 
cooperation. Finally, the framework highlights the salience of BMI and 
exploration to entrepreneurship, which the extant version of learning-based view 
fails to explicitly emphasize. 
Fourth, the framework bears an implication for the mainstream theories in 
international business in three areas. Specifically, the traditional model of 
internationalization path (Johanson and Vahlnes, 2003, 2006) can benefit from 
the framework by emphasizing more on aggressive exploration-based learning 
beyond its original focus on conservative exploitation-based learning, especially 
for top-down ventures (or bottom-up ventures).  Further, the model of 
ownership-location-internalization (Dunning, 1995, 2001) can also benefit from 
the framework by emphasizing more on exploration beyond exploitation, 
especially for top-down ventures (or bottom-up ventures). Finally, the research 
on HSR can benefit from the framework by highlighting the salience of 
partnership between HQ and subsidiary rather than the traditional approach to 
HQ and subsidiary as separated agents. 
Fifth, the framework implicitly suggests the direction for future research 
toward an integration of three fields of research at the intersections between 
international business, entrepreneurship, and strategic management toward an 
interdisciplinary domain of international strategic entrepreneurship (ISE). It is 
expected that ISE will have perhaps the best potential for future research. 
 
Implications for Future Practices toward HQ-Subsidiary Partnership  
Our study provides different perspectives to explain why some firms should 
be more able to conduct international entrepreneurship and seek new 
opportunity rapidly under conditions of resource scarcity than others. First, we 
argue that entrepreneurial aspiration at HQ plays a paramount role in 
entrepreneurial actions in host country. Given the contextual distance and 
competitive asymmetry between developed economics and developing 
economics, this special form of entrepreneurship for established firms differs 
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from the focus of international entrepreneurship on the “born-global” firms who 
never suffer from such constraints (Autio, George and Alexy, 2011; Jones and 
Coviello, 2005). For example, design new business model in emerging markets 
for SMEs’ HQ is international entrepreneurship and is a key decision, and a 
crucial - perhaps more difficult - task because it may be conflict with the 
prevailing business model or with the underlying configuration of assets that 
support that prevailing model (Zott and Amit, 2010). The new strategies or 
business models are generally assumed to involve increased risk (Bromiley, 
1991). In general, mature firms are risk averse especially when their 
performance is good in home country. Aspiration is the driver of risky choices of 
firms (Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). If these firms lack of 
aspiration, they are more inclined to take the conservative behaviors. So, these 
behaviors will delay or slow down the process of internationalization. 
    Second, processes flexibility at HQ is a firm-level capability that positively 
influences firm innovation speed and performance of entrepreneurial process in 
host country. International entrepreneurship is a process, rather than a static 
phenomenon (Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). According to learning-based view 
of internationalization, this process is accelerated learning process in which 
firms need to ambidextrously balance exploration and exploitation within 
hierarchy boundaries. Based on organizational learning theory, two major types 
of learning occur through several avenues including action (called learning by 
doing) and memory (the constant repetition of an organization’s activities) 
(Lieberman, 1984; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Zahra et al., 1999). Processes 
flexibility at HQ is a driver of accelerated learning and very useful to innovation 
actions and activities in subsidiary. From these actions and activities, firms can 
get deep and new knowledge about local customers, partners, culture, and 
institutions in host country. Thus, organizational learning creates knowledge as 
the source of accelerated internationalization. 
In sum, our finding on entrepreneurial aspiration and policy flexibility is 
important because it helps addresses a primary puzzle in the literature on 
international entrepreneurship. They are two drivers of risky choices and 
accelerated learning, and are useful to explain the big research question: how 
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and why some firms can internationalize early and rapidly whereas others 
cannot. 
 
Limitations 
Similar to most studies, this study has limitations. For example, using the 
longitudinal data of more than one year, we only followed the initial stage of BMI 
among the six sampled SMEs from Denmark. Our research is the first step in 
addressing the empirical challenge of opening the “black box” of BMI process 
for top-down ventures. Further, this study focuses heavily on the perspective of 
HQ rather than the perspective of subsidiary. Our future research projects will 
address the above limitations. 
 
Conclusion 
By focusing on how SMEs’ HQ facilitates BMI at the subsidiary level for top-
down ventures, this study has the potential contributions to the literatures of IE, 
SE, learning-based view, and also international business models toward the 
interdisciplinary domain of ISE. Based upon the rich field data, our primary 
contribution is a novel process framework with three sets of core constructs with 
their causal links. In particular, this study has sought to fill the gap in the 
literature concerning the issue of BMI for top-down ventures engaged by SMEs. 
Our process framework bears key implications for both research and 
practice. This framework showcases the potential to integrate the research 
streams of IE, SE, and international business with the shared theme of 
accelerated learning as the core of learning-based view of internationalization 
toward an interdisciplinary domain of ISE. This framework can help explain and 
implement BMI for top-down ventures. Future research is required to refine and 
test the basic research propositions derived from the process framework. 
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